

Privacy in The Blockchain Era

A soft introduction to zero knowledge proofs

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Simple Marketing Real Story

Email Marketing

- Provider had signed agreements from a large demographic base
- Would promote our services to relevant profiles

Asks:

• For our own full list of user emails, to be used as "suppression"

Alarm:

• We have to fully trust them with our data, have no means of verifying the service was provided and we pay them



How We Protected Our Users Data

Email Marketing

- Provider had signed agreements from a large demographic base
- Would promote our services to relevant profiles

Solution: Send them a list of *hashed* email addresses

- + Our users emails are not disclosed
- + They can still "suppress" existing users
- Existing users are exposed



Hash Functions

Any function that can be used to map data of arbitrary size to fixed-size values.

Cryptographic hash function:

- Deterministic
- Quick to compute
- Preimage resistant
- Collision resistant

Input Digest cryptographic DFCD 3454 BBEA 788A 751A Fox hash 696C 24D9 7009 CA99 2D17 function The red fox cryptographic 0086 46BB FB7D CBE2 823C jumps over hash ACC7 6CD1 90B1 EE6E 3ABC the blue doa function The red fox cryptographic 8FD8 7558 7851 4F32 D1C6 hash jumps ouer 76B1 79A9 0DA4 AEFE 4819 the blue dog function The red fox cryptographic FCD3 7FDB 5AF2 C6FF 915F jumps oevr hash D401 COA9 7D9A 46AF FB45 the blue dog function The red fox cryptographic 8ACA D682 D588 4C75 4BF4 hash jumps oer 1799 7D88 BCF8 92B9 6A6C the blue dog function

Source: Wikipedia



Enter Rock–paper–scissors

Game as a fair choosing method

Similar function as coin flipping

Not truly random

How do you do that online?



Commitment scheme

Cryptographic primitive that allows one to commit to a chosen value (or chosen statement) while keeping it hidden to others, with the ability to reveal the committed value later. Say Alice and Bob play Rock-Paper-Scissors.

- 1. Alice:
 - a. chooses v as her call
 - b. chooses a random ${\tt R}\,$ and then computes ${\tt h=hash(v\mid \mid R)}$
 - c. sends h to Bob
- 2. Bob makes his call and reports it
- 3. Alice reveals what she commited to by exposing both v and ${\ensuremath{\mathbb R}}$
- 4. Bob verifies that v and R match the commitment





Public Key Cryptography

Symmetric encryption:

A: coded_message = encrypt(message, key)

B: message = decrypt(coded_message, key) <<< same key

With public key cryptography, each entity has a pair of keys: one private and one public. The private key is generated offline and it doesn't need to be sent over the wire at all.

```
A: coded_message = encrypt(message, private_key_a)
```

```
B: message = decrypt(coded_message, public_key_a)
```



Zero Knowledge Proofs

Wikipedia: "a method by which

one party (the prover) can prove to

another party (the verifier)

that they know a value x,

without conveying any information

apart from

the fact that they know the value x."





Zero Knowledge Proofs - Simple Examples

1. The color blind person can be convinced that objects have different colors even if they don't see it

2. Prove the color of a card you picked from a playing cards pack

3. Where's Wally?





Zero Knowledge Proofs

A sort of generalization of both hashes and public key cryptography.

Hashes \rightarrow "proof of data"

Public key cryptography \rightarrow "proof of private key ownership"

Zero Knowledge Proofs \rightarrow "proof of computation"

Allows a Verifier to ascertain that the Prover executed a public/shared computation over private data that returned a public/shared result and *the risk of Prover cheating is negligible*.



Zero Knowledge Proofs

Key Properties

- 1. Completeness if the statement is True, an honest Verifier will be convinced by this fact
- 2. Soundness a malicious Prover cannot convince the Verifier of a false statement
- 3. Zero Knowledge no other information except that the statement is True is revealed to the Verifier

Verification DOES NOT mean recomputation! (unlike blockchain)

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zk SNARKS

SNARK referring to "Succinct Non-interactive ARgument of Knowledge"

Elements of a zkSNARK:

- 1. (prover_key, verifier_key) := setup(circuit)
- 2. proof := generateProof(prover_key, inputs, circuit)
- 3. true/false := verifyProof(verifier key, proof)



zk SNARKS

- short and non interactive proofs
- zero knowledge
- verification cost independent of computational complexity

• proof: 3 EC Points = 127 bytes

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zokrates.github.io

ZoKrates is a toolbox for zkSNARKs on Ethereum

def main(private field a, field b) -> (field):
 field result = if a * a == b then 1 else 0 fi
 return result



zokrates.github.io

compile

./zokrates compile -i root.code

perform the setup phase
./zokrates setup

execute the program

./zokrates compute-witness -a 337 113569

generate a proof of computation
./zokrates generate-proof

export a solidity verifier
./zokrates export-verifier

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Example: Confidential Transactions on Ethereum

Normally, an ERC20 token will hold:

```
mapping (address => uint256) balances;
```

And when a transfer is made, it must check:

```
balances[fromAddress] >= value
```

Source: https://media.consensys.net/introduction-to-zksnarks-with-examples-3283b554fc3b

Example: Confidential Transactions on Ethereum

In CT, we replace the balance with the hash of balance:

```
mapping (address => bytes32) balanceHashes;
```

What becomes private: balances and sent amounts.

And when a transfer is made, both sender and receiver must produce each a SNARK:

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Example: Confidential Transactions on Ethereum

```
function senderFunction(x, w) {
```

return (

w.senderBalanceBefore > w.value &&

sha256(w.value) == x.hashValue &&

```
sha256(w.senderBalanceBefore) ==
    x.hashSenderBalanceBefore &&
```

sha256(

```
w.senderBalanceBefore - w.value
```

```
== x.hashSenderBalanceAfter
```

```
function receiverFunction(x, w) {
```

return (

sha256(w.value) == x.hashValue &&

sha256(w.receiverBalanceBefore) ==

x.hashReceiverBalanceBefore &&

sha256(

w.receiverBalanceBefore + w.value

== x.hashReceiverBalanceAfter



zkSNARI	K Conter	nders			
	Prover Complexity	Verifier Complexity	Typical Proof Sizes	Security Assumption	Trusted Setup
zkSNARKS	O(n * log(n))	~O(1)	127 bytes [Groth16]	Knowledge of exponent	yes
zkSTARKs	O(n * poly-log(n))	O(poly-log(n))	Few kilobytes	Collision-resistant Hash-Function	no
Bulletproofs	O(n * log(n))	O(n)	Few hundred kilobytes	Discrete Log Hardness	no



Zero Knowledge Proofs - Applications

- No longer send plain text passwords over the wire, but proofs of password hashes
- Proof of owning a document, without revealing its content
- Authentication
- Scale blockchains: move computation off-chain, have smart contracts only do verification
- Confidential transactions
- Constant size blockchain: Coda Protocol recursive composition of zk-SNARKs



Thank you

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